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I. INTRODUCTION
"Suppose some one devised a set of words or symbols to form
a new abstract speech, with inflections, but as yet with no
meaning, a kind of blank Esperanto. "
Learned Hand, 1921'
XML, the Extensible Markup Language, "has taken the computer world
by storm."2 One of the countless XML primers on computer bookshelves
proclaims: "XML promises to transform the basic structure of the Web,
moving beyond HTML and replacing it with a stronger, more extensible
architecture."' Bill Gates, chairman of Microsoft Corporation, calls XML
a "breakthrough technology."4 According to Tim Berners-Lee, inventor of
the World Wide Web, XML is one of two main technologies that will create
the "Semantic Web," which "will bring structure to the meaningful content
of Web pages, creating an environment where software agents roaming from
page to page can readily carry out sophisticated tasks for users."'
XML is not itself a complete markup language. Rather, XML has been
called a language for creating other languages.6 More specifically, XML is a
syntax that allows computer users to create their own sets of markup tags,
also known as "schemas."' The "most widely used markup language in the
universe" is HTML, the HyperText Markup Language.! HTML is used
primarily to control the appearance of documents on the World Wide Web.9
XML, in contrast, enables users to specify markup tags that identify
' Reiss v. Nat'l Quotation Bureau, Inc., 276 F. 717, 718 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
2 BRIAN E. TRAVIS, XML AND SOAP PROGRAMMING FOR BIzTALK SERVERS xiii (2000). SOAP,
the Simple Object Access Protocol, "is an Internet Engineering Task Force (ETF) Internet draft that lets
you invoke procedures on remote systems by using a standard set of XML tags." Id. at 18.
' SIMON ST. LAURENT, XML: A PRIMER 1 (2d ed. 1999).
4 TRAVIS, supra note 2, at xiii.
' Tim Berners-Lee et al., The Semantic Web: A New Form of Web Content That Is Meaningful to
Computers Will Unleash a Revolution of New Possibilities, Sci. AM. 34, 36 (May 2001). Like any computer
trend, XML also has its skeptics. See Peter Lucas, Pumped Up. Business Reachesfor the Promise of XML,
ELECTRoNIc COM. WORLD, April 2001, at 25 ("When Extensible Markup Language debuted as a data
exchange language in the late 1990s, it did not take long for chief technology officers to discover that the
initial hype surrounding XML was overblown.").
6 ELIZABETH CASTRO, XML FOR THE WORLD WIDE WEB 35 (2001).
TRAVIS, supra note 2, at 1, 40-42.
la at 35. Travis cites estimates "that 100 billion HTML pages are on the Web." Id
9 ST. LAURENT, supra note 3, at 10 ("HTML was doomed to life as a formatting language instead of
a structured framework for documents").
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document elements according to their content."0 Then, with style sheets,
XML can be used to serve documents on the Web, or otherwise exchange
documents over networks, so that the documents not only appear as
intended but also allow search engines and software agents to locate and
process particular types of content by referring to the specified tags.1
XML, in other words, is something like the "blank Esperanto" that
Learned Hand imagined-with XML's syntax specifying the "inflections,"
and XML schemas filling in the blanks. Hand concluded that the core set of
words, symbols, and inflections, even if meaningless, could be protected by
copyright. 2 But how does such a view hold up today, eighty years later?
And how does it apply to copyright in the schemas that extend XML's
vocabulary and give meaning to XML documents?
The XML specification is an open standard set by the World Wide Web
Consortium (W3C), a group of companies that includes software industry
leaders."3 The copyright status of XML schemas, however, is an open
question. One XML entrepreneur states: "XML schemas are becoming the
intellectual property of e-business... "14 Although some authors of XML
schemas have explicitly dedicated them to the public domain,"5 others treat
10 Id. at 15. HTML can be written as XML using the XHTML specification. TIM BERNERS-LEE &
MARK FiscHETTI, WEAVING THE WEB: THE ORIGINAL DESIGN AND ULTIMATE DESTINY OF THE
WORLD WIDE WEB BY ITS INVENTOR 162 (1999).
" See ST. LAURENT, supra note 3, at 1 (introducing the capabilities of XML).
u Reiss, 276 F. at 718, 719.
" See W3C Intellectual Property FAQ, at http://www.w3.org/Consortium/Legal/IPR-FAQ-
20000620.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2001) (explaining the facets of the standard). Tim Berners-Lee, now
the Director of W3C, has described his relief when CERN, the European Particle Physics Laboratory at
which he invented the Web, agreed in 1993 to place the Web protocol and code in the public domain.
BERNERS-LEE, supra note 10, at 74.
", Extensibility's XMLschemacom Goes Live; New Site Provides Ubiquitous Supportfor Managing and
Exchanging XML-Based E-Business Grammars, Bus. WIRE, Dec. 8, 1999, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News
Group File, All. XML schemas may also embody business rules or processes that companies consider
their intellectual property. According to a news story, "Extensibility's XML Authority, a software
package priced at $99.95, allows companies to use existing intellectual property as XML schemas."
Christina Dyrness, LocalFirm a Leader in Web Field, RALEIGH NEWS AND OBSERVER, May 19, 1999, at
D1.
15 See, e.g., Tom Sawyer, Data Standards Sought, ENGINEERING NEws-REcORD, Feb. 12,2001, at 21
(stating that a plant design and automating consultant said his company is "plac[ing] its own XML schema
for control valves and centrifugal compressors in the public domain in a bid to entice others to do the
same"); Clive Davidson, Reuters Increases Commitment to XML, SEC. INDUSTRY NEWS, Jan. 29, 2001,
LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File, All (Reuters has contributed NewsML, its XML specification
for news stories, to the public domain). Explicitly contributing an XML schema to the public domain
at least implies, of course, that the schema would or at least might otherwise be copyrightable.
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their XML schemas as proprietary.1 6 Still others take a mixed approach. For
example, XrML (Extensible Rights Markup Language) is licensed to the
public on a royalty-free basis."7 The license, however, includes various
covenants by the licensee, such as an agreement to use reasonable efforts to
ensure compatibility of the licensee's products with XrML."8 Clicking an
"accept" button for the license terms is a prerequisite for even viewing the
XrML specification.19
If a particular XML schema succeeds in fulfilling XML's advertised
potential for providing the "linguafranca of e-commerce transactions"'2 in
a particular industry, or for a particular set of applications, then copyright
ownership of the schema can carry with it significant practical influence and
economic power. Developing proprietary "extensions" of public domain
technology in hopes of gaining effective control of the technology is not an
unknown strategy in the technology industry. Extensible Markup Language,
by definition, is extensible, and XML schemas are the extensions. Although
a copyright owner may be likely to be constrained to grant free or inexpen-
sive licenses to at least some users to make the schema effective, the owner
can selectively withhold licenses from, for example, those who want to
modify the language, and in other cases the owner can collect substantial
royalties for granting license rights.2
Because XML schemas are commonly called markup languages,22 the
novel question whether XML schemas are potentially protected by
copyright-i.e., "copyrightable"-implicates a more familiar but, surprisingly,
6 "Some vendors are writing proprietary schema, raising data exchange concerns." Sawyer, supra
note 15, at 21. For example, one news article reports that a company known as printCafe "has developed
a new data-exchange protocol... based on XML," but the new protocol "is not public domain." Burt
Langford, E-production Is E-volving, BUsINESS AND MANAGEMENT PRACTICES, FoLIo SPECIAL SouRcE
BOOK ISSUE (2001), LEXIS Nexis Library, Company News File, All. Rather, "(i]n one form or another,
you have to do business with printCafe to use it ... ." IL
" See XrML License Agreement, at http://www.xrml.org/xrml-license.stm (last visited Aug. 30,
2001).
Id
1 See id
20 TRAVIS, supra note 2, at 33.
" The interplay of interests will not always be obvious. Some XML schema authors may not need
to rely on proprietary rights in a schema-for example, if they supply software (apart from the schema)
that is dearly copyrightable and essential in making productive use of the schema-and some suppliers of
such software may prefer broad access to schemas authored by others. The analysis in this Article does
not attempt to determine which interests might or might not benefit from XML schema copyrightability,
but instead focuses on legal issues that warrant attention by all concerned.
22 See CASTRO, supra note 6; TRAvIS, supra note 2.
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still-unresolved question of copyright law. That question is whether
computer languages in general are copyrightable. At the same time, XML
schemas have particular characteristics that differentiate them from other
computer languages and that warrant specific consideration.
This Article, after further describing XML and XML schemas, reviews
the general question of computer language copyright. The Article then
addresses the particular characteristics of XML schemas that relate to
copyrightability. Next, the Article examines the possibility that XML
schemas represent a "merger" of expression and idea. The merger doctrine,
although deeply embedded in copyright doctrine and history, is not free
from confusion. Its application involves a complex process of constructive
abstraction. Nevertheless, this doctrine plays a central role in preserving
expressive and "receptive" freedom, and the various copyright compromises
of recent legislation have not substantially changed it.
The Article concludes that, although software for developing, validating,
and using XML schemas ordinarily will be copyrightable, the established
copyright principles reflected in the merger doctrine raise significant
questions about the copyrightability of XML schemas themselves. The
Article also suggests that consideration of the copyrightability of XML
schemas may help focus the broader issues presented by the broader question
whether copyright protects any computer language.
II. HTML, XML, AND XML SCHEMAS
One reason for the success of the World Wide Web is the relative
simplicity of HTML, the language in which Web pages are formatted.23 To
see how XML differs from HTML, and to examine the copyright issues
posed by XML-based markup languages, consider an example. Here is a
fragment of HTML code defining the body of a hypothetical Web page:
< body >
< hi > Welcome to the Dry-as-Dust Martini Page </hi >
< p > Here's all you need: </p >
<ul>
< li > 5 ounces gin </li >
2) SeeST. LAURENT, supra note 3, at 10. HTML is an application of SGML, the Standard Generalized
Markup Language. L at 7. XML can be viewed as a simplified version of SGML. Id at 12.
2001]
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< li > 1/2 ounce vermouth </li >
< li > 1 gin-soaked olive </li >
"</ul >
< p > Here's all you do : </p >
<p>Shake.</p>
<p>Drink.</p>
< p > Repeat. </p >
</body>2
4
The available elements and attributes in HTML, and the rules that govern
potential values of those attributes, are determined by the HTML language
specification and, as a practical matter, by browser vendors. As HTML has
evolved, browser vendors have added new markup tags. Nevertheless,
HTML remains essentially a formatting language, as illustrated by the tags
above, and one to which individuals and companies (other than browser
vendors) are not generally able to add new tags. The p (paragraph) element
may contain text on any subject; the p tag relates only to how the text will
look. The 1i (list item) element may contain items that describe ingredients
for a martini, the names of baseball players, or the number of cabins in
Montana. HTML does not know, and it does not care.
In XML, the available elements and attributes, and rules governing the
values of those attributes, can be defined by anyone. This characteristic is
what makes XML "extensible"-anyone can "extend" XML-and it is also
what makes XML, by itself, something less than the "markup language" its
name denotes. The ultimate markup language is not XML alone but rather
the combination of XML and a "document type definition" (DTD) or other
"schema" in which someone defines a set of available elements and attributes,
using syntax consistent with the W3C XML specification."
24 An HTML document contains two basic "elements," the head and the body. Nested within the
body element are various additional elements that present the content on the browser screen. For example,
the img element tells the browser to insert an image. The img element has an "attribute" called src, for
source. The "value" of this attribute is the name of the source file for the image. The hi element specifies
a top-level header, the precise appearance of which is selectable by the user as a browser preference. The
p element specifies a paragraph. The ul element refers to an unnumbered list, and the li element refers to
a list item. See generally W3C, HTML 4.01 Specification (Dec. 24, 1999), at http://w-ww.w3.org/TR/
html4/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2001).
2 See CASTRO, supra note 6, at 13.
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For example, the HTML document outlined above could be converted
to an XML document, but first it would be necessary to create a new set of
markup tags (or to define the existing HTML tags in an XML schema). We
could call the new markup language defined by our new set of tags HHML,
for Happy Hour Markup Language. To take advantage of XML, one would
want to create HHML tags that do not merely specify formatting but that
have substantive meaning. For example, the ul element, rather than being
just any unnumbered list, could become the recipe element. We could add
an attribute for the recipe element called drink, the value of which would be
the drink's name. The i elements within the ul element could be retagged
as ingredient elements. In XML, the relevant portion of the code would look
like this:
< recipe category ="martini" drink ="Dry-as-Dust Martini" >
< ingredient > 5 ounces gin </ingredient >
< ingredient > 1/2 ounce vermouth < /ingredient >
< ingredient > 1 gin-soaked olive < /ingredient >
</recipe >
To be able to use these new elements and attributes, we would need to
define them in a DTD or other schema. We could define the element recipe
and the attributes category and drink with the following fragment of a DTD:
<!ELEMENT recipe (ingredient +) >
<!ATTLIST
recipe category (martini I margarita I other) #REQUIRED
recipe drink CDATA #REQUIRED >
This DTD fragment defines the element recipe as containing one or more
instances of the element ingredient and as having two attributes, category and
drink, each of which is required to be given a value in any code written with
HI-IML. The category attribute must have one of the three values shown in
the definition; the drink attribute can contain any character data (letters,
numbers, etc.). Although the fragment shown here is just that, full-fledged
XML schemas are often colloquially called markup languages.
HTML tags, as mentioned earlier, tell a Web browser how to format the
contents of a document. XML tags, based on an XML schema, can richly
describe the content but not the format. Web designers use separate code
2001]
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known as style sheets, or other formatting technologies, to control the
appearance of an XML document.26 For documents tagged in Happy Hour
Markup Language, we could use a style sheet to specify formatting for the
recipe and ingredient elements that would cause them to appear the way we
wanted, perhaps exactly as the ui and 1i elements appear in HTML. The
difference is that, in HTML, we would not have created objects within our
Web page that other Web sites or applications could access based on their
content. For example, if someone wanted to collect mixed-drink recipes that
appear on the Web in HTML pages, it would be necessary to rely on an
existing classification by a search engine such as Yahoo! or to look for
appearances of various words describing mixed drinks along with the word
"recipe." In either case, collecting the recipes would require manually trying
to identify, extract, and organize relevant information.
With Happy Hour Markup Language, however, a search engine or
software agent could locate Web pages that use HHML and, within those
pages, go straight to the drink recipes. Because the recipe element includes
category and drink attributes, the values of which are the drink's category and
name, it would be easy to assemble a list of recipes by drink categories and
names. Other attributes such as degree of dryness, alcohol content, and the
like could be added to HHML and additional preset drink category names
could be specified when desired. Some attributes could be required and
others could be optional. The ingredient elements could be structured to
require numeric data for quantities and, separately, ingredient names chosen
from a list. Applications or Web services could then be developed that
would allow users to choose among various drinks described on various sites
and, based on the number of guests expected, to compute shopping lists for
relevant ingredients.
Eventually, if enough Web sites relating to mixed drinks elected to adopt
Happy Hour Markup Language, or if an industry group could be persuaded
to adopt it, HHMIL could become the "standard" (or at least a standard)
markup language for Web pages relating to mixed drinks. HHML-oriented
browser extensions or plug-ins might emerge. People would expect drink-
related sites to expose at least part of their content using standard HHML
tags. Vendors of drink ingredients would want to make recommended drink
26 See id at 177.
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recipes on their sites, based on their ingredients, accessible to HHML-
enabled browsers.
Or so we can imagine, for illustrative purposes. There is no HHML, and
with any luck there never will be, but other XML schemas are already in use,
both on the Web and in other forms of information interchange. They
include, among others, schemas for distribution of news stories, automotive
information, and financial, insurance, and medical data. 7 The predicted
XML-based transformation of the Web depends on the proliferation of such
XML schemas. If an XML schema became prevalent in the way hypothe-
sized here, the commercial implications of copyright ownership in it could
be substantial, at least in its particular zone of application. The copyright
owner could not adopt too strict an enforcement policy at the outset, or no
one would use the markup language based on that schema. Commercial
success ordinarily would depend on widespread use. But if the markup
language did become a standard, copyright ownership in it could be used
selectively to protect the copyright owner's technological and market
position.
This point was first noticed in the software industry context more than
a decade ago, when Ashton-Tate Corporation, then the publisher of dBASE
database management software, sued competing software companies for
allegedly infringing Ashton-Tate's asserted copyright in the dBASE language
by supplying compatible database software." The compatible software was
built with different code but allowed users to employ the same dBASE
language available in dBASE itself. In response to the lawsuit, the main
defendant, Fox Software, Inc., sent an "[o]pen [1]etter to [the dBASE]
[1]anguage [c]ommunity."29 The open letter stated that Ashton-Tate and its
founder, George Tate,3" had "encouraged all of us-not just Fox-to produce
applications, compilers, interpreters, report writers, program generators, etc.
which utilize and support the [dBASE] language," to maximize Ashton-
27 TRAVIS, supra note 2, at 22, 31-32.
' Elizabeth G. Lowry, Comment, Copyright Protectionfor Computer Languages: Creative Incentive
or Technological Threat?, 39 EMORY L.J. 1293, 1294 (1990).
9 Fox Software/Ashton.Tate: Fox Software Open Letter to [dBASE] Language Community Regarding
Fox Software andAshton-Tate Litigation, Bus. WIRE, Dec. 13, 1988 LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group
File, All, quoted in Lowry, supra note 28, at 1310 n.73.
'3 "Ashton" was Tate's pet parrot. See Victor F. Zonana, Ashton-Tate; Confronting a Hard Life in the
World ofSoftware, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 1987, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File, All.
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Tate's market share." According to the letter, when Ashton-Tate sued Fox,
Ashton-Tate's share had reached sixty percent of the market. 2
Although the parties settled the Ashton-Tate litigation before any
decision on the language-copyrightability issue," the dBASE example shows
that vigorous efforts to promote standardization on a particular language do
not preclude eventual efforts by the author of that language to use copyright
against actual or potential competitors for the supply of software or
associated tools or services. Thus, the dependence of XML-based markup
languages on wide acceptance does not ensure that they will be placed in the
public domain. Whether copyright law will support copyright claims in
XML-based markup languages is, accordingly, a question worth explor-
ing-both because of its implications for copyright doctrine, and in its own
right.
EII. COPYRIGHTABILITY OF COMPUTER LANGUAGES
Whether computer languages in general are capable of being protected by
copyright is an "unsettled and confusing area of law." 4 No reported court
decision expressly determines this issue.3" Ashton-Tate sued its competitors
in personal computing antiquity (1988), but the case produced no relevant
precedent. 6  During medieval times (the early and mid-1990's), Lotus
Development Corporation pursued litigation against Borland International,
Inc., for infringing Lotus's alleged copyright in the Lotus 1-2-3 "menu
command hierarchy," but the litigation eventually was resolved without
" Fox Software/Ashton-Tate: Fox Software Open Letter to [dBASE] Language Community Regarding
Fox Software and Asbton-Tate Litigation, supra note 29.
32 IaL
"S See Richard O'Reilly, The Future ofDatabase Programs, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1992, at D-3, LEXIS,
Nexis Library, News Group File, All.
' Michael P. Doerr, Note,Java" An Innovation in SoftwareDevelopment anda Dilemma in Copyright
Law, 7J. INTELL. PROP. L. 127, 127 (1999).
s hi In Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F.3d 1115,51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1825 (9th Cir.
1999), Sun alleged that Microsoft had committed copyright infringement by exceeding the scope of a
license agreement under which Sun had licensed the Java programming language to Microsoft. Id. at 1117.
The court did not address the copyrightability of Java, see id., and the parties subsequently settled the
dispute. Linda Leung, Client; Sun and Microsoft Settle Their Java Licensing Row, COMPUTING, Feb. 1,
2001, at 28 LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File, All.
' See O'Reilly, supra note 33, at D-3.
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determining the copyrightability of computer languages.3" This key question
of law thus remains without an authoritative answer.
Computer languages may well embody patentable inventions if they
possess sufficient novelty and non-obviousness.38 Copyright protection,
however, if it subsists at all, automatically applies without the formalities,
costs, and delays of patent prosecution or the burdens of establishing
patentability.39 The automatic nature of copyright, and the absence of any
need to show novelty or non-obviousness, make copyright a vital asset in the
information technology marketplace.
Under the Copyright Act, "[c]opyright protection subsists.., in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression ... " as soon
as they are so fixed.4" Protection for an original work of authorship does
not, however, "extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which
it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."4'
The dichotomy between copyrightable "expression" and uncopyrightable
"ideas," "procedures," and the like codified in the Copyright Act was set
forth in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880), in which the Supreme Court,
more than a century ago, rejected a claim of copyright in an accounting
system described in a book.42 The Court declared: "The description of the
art in a book, though entitled to the benefit of copyright, lays no foundation
for an exclusive claim to the art itself."43 Protection for the art itself would
arise, if at all, from issuance of a patent, not as a matter of copyright."
"r Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807,815,34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1014, 1021 (1st Cir.
1995), affid by an equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996). An earlier Lotus action against Paperback
Software, International, produced a favorable result for Lotus, but the district court rejected an argument
based on the asserted uncopyrightability of computer languages without dearly addressing whether
computer languages are copyrightable subject matter. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l,
740 F. Supp. 37, 73, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1577, 1604 (D. Mass. 1990).
38 See Marci A. Hamilton & Ted Sabety, Computer Science Concepts in Copyright Cases: The Path to
a Coherent Law, 10 HARv.J. LAW & TEcH. 239, 263 n.95 (1997).
" See 17 U.S.C. S 102(a) (2001).
Id. In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1275
(1991), the Supreme Court held that works of authorship are "original" unless they fall into the "narrow
category of works in which the creative spark is utterly lacking or so trivial as to be virtually nonexistent."
Id. at 359. The Court stated: "As a constitutional matter, copyright protects only those constituent
elements of a work that possess more than a de minimis quantum of creativity." Id at 363.
,' 17 U.S.C. 5 102(b).
42 Baker v. Seldon, 101 U.S. 99 (1880).
4' Id at 105.
" Id at 102-03.
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In assessing copyrightability of languages, one may distinguish between
a specification or other description of the language (potentially analogous to
the book in Baker) and the language itself (potentially analogous to the "art"
that the book describes). Just as Danish is broader and richer than any
Danish dictionary or Danish grammar, a computer language is more than,
and different from, any of the myriad books that may have been written
about it. Few are likely to dispute that a language specification or other
description of the language is copyrightable. Likewise, a computer program
written in a computer language is protectable by copyright.4" The issue, at
least as ordinarily viewed, is whether the author of an original language
specification owns a copyright in the language itself, so that anyone who uses
the language-i.e., creates sentences or writes programs in the language,
enables others to do so, or modifies the language-without the author's
permission is a copyright infringer.
Computer languages, unlike most human languages, are created by
individuals and thus, potentially, are "works of authorship." Although new
computer languages may draw on concepts from prior languages, they are
often likely to contain original aspects.46 For that matter, the specification
of a computer language may be a supremely creative original work of
authorship.47
Learned Hand seemed almost to anticipate the issue faced today. In Reiss
v. National Quotation Bureau, Inc., Hand concluded that a telegraph
codebook containing 6,325 coined, meaningless words was copyrightable. 8
" See 17 U.S.C. S 101; Hamilton & Sabety, supra note 38, at 240.
The originality requirement for copyright requires "little creativity." Doerr, supra note 34, at 141.
Thus, "a computer language in all likelihood meets the originality standard," although "its developer may
have difficulty establishing which elements of the language are original and which are copied from a
preexisting language." Lowry, supra note 28, at 1308, quoted in Doerr, supra note 34, at 141.
' Cf. Ronald L. Johnston & Allen R. Grogan, Copyright Protection for Command Driven Interfaces,
8 COMPUTER LAW. 1, 2 (June 1991) (emphasizing the creativity required to develop a user interface,
including predefined command sequences).
" 276 F. 717, 718 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). Kenneth W. Dam, Some Economic Considerations in the
Intellectual Property Protection of Software, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 321, 324 n.14 (1995) (providing factual
background).
The development of telegraphy led to the preparation of code books, consisting of
lists of 'words' that had no ordinary meaning, which might appear alone or
accompanied by another list of common expressions within a particular area of
commerce. By assigning meanings to the code words, persons could communicate
secret messages to one another. The copyrightability of such compilations was
accepted without difficulty, even though they were manifestly entirely functional and
the lists of code words communicated nothing whatever on their own.
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This was the context in which Hand wrote of a "blank Esperanto."49 He
added: "Suppose a mathematician were to devise a new set of compressed
and more abstract symbols, and left them for some conventional meaning to
be filled in.""0 According to Hand, these sets of symbols, to which the
codebook was similar, would be copyrightable, and the codebook therefore
was as well." But Hand's analysis also contains blanks.5 2
Indeed, despite such early decisions upholding copyright in telegraph
codebooks," most law review commentary has rejected the idea that
computer languages are subject matter in which copyright protection can
subsist.5 4 Ten years ago, one commentator wrote:
Until quite recently few observers would have considered
copyright protection for computer programming language
to be a matter of legal controversy, or even concern. The
general assumption was that computer programming
languages were not subject to copyright protection because
they were unprotectable "ideas," rather than protectable
"expressions" of ideas. 5
The issue of computer language copyrightability has become an explicit
question, rather than a matter of assumption, as the software industry has
evolved and software companies have asserted copyright protection in menu
Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1149, 1192 (1998).
'9 Reiss, 276 F. at 718.
5' l at 718, 719.
s After speaking of mathematical symbols to which meaning had not yet been assigned, Hand
dismissed Baker v. Selden as "too foreign to the case at bar to deserve comment," id. at 719, without
explaining why. This omission calls into question Hand's conclusion. In Baker, the Supreme Court
specifically stated: "The copyright of a work on mathematical science cannot give to the author an
exclusive right to the methods of operation which he propounds, or to the diagrams which he employs
to explain them, so as to prevent an engineer from using them whenever occasion requires." 101 U.S. at
103.
s Hartfield v. Peterson, 91 F.2d 998, 1000 (2d Cir. 1937) (Augustus Hand, J.); Reiss, 276 F. at 719.
54 See, e.g., Hamilton & Sabety, supra note 38, at 242; Lowry, supra note 28, at 1296; Richard H.
Stern, Copyright in Computer Programming Languages, 17 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 321, 334
(1991); Steve Posner, Can a Computer Language Be Copyrighted? The State of Confusion in Computer
Copyright Law, 11 COMPUTER/L.J. 97,97 (1991).
ss Stern, supra note 54, at 322.
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command hierarchies, 6 graphical user interfaces," and new languages such
as Java. 8
In addition to various policy arguments, 9 two primary arguments based
on copyright law principles have been advanced against recognizing
copyright protection for computer languages themselves, as opposed to the
specifications that define them or the code that implements them on a
particular machine. The first such argument is that computer languages are
not protected by copyright because, under Baker v. Selden and the modern
Copyright Act, they are uncopyrightable "systems" or other "ideas."" The
second is that languages are not protected because they are not fully fixed in
a tangible medium of expression.61 These arguments, not yet tested in any
reported decision, raise serious questions that must be addressed by an
assessment of possible copyright protection for computer languages.
A. COMPUTER LANGUAGES AS SYSTEMS
The most straightforward argument against copyrightability is that
"computer languages are systems or ideas."62 The Copyright Act makes clear
that, even though a system may be embodied or explained in an original
work of authorship, the system itself is not copyrightable. 3 "Like any
language, a computer language is a system of vocabulary and grammar
s See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 809 (Ist Cir. 1995), affd hy an equally
divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
s See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1438 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513
U.s. 1184 (1995).
5 See Doerr, supra note 34, at 127.
s' See Posner, supra note 54, at 100-03.
See, e.g., Stern, supra note 54, at 353; Lowry, supra note 28, at 1296.
" Hamilton & Sabety, supra note 38, at 269. Hamilton and Sabety also contend that computer
language copyright also violates "First Amendment principles." Id at 270. They state: "By authorizing
protection for languages, the Act would be authorizing prior restraint of any expression in that language."
Id The authority they cite, however, merely reaffirms that "[n]o author may copyright his ideas or the
facts he narrates." Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556, 225 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 1073, 1079 (1985), quoted in Hamilton & Sabety, supra note 38, at 270 n.119. The question thus
reduces to the first of the two issues highlighted in the text, namely whether a computer language
constitutes an unprotectable "idea" or "system" rather than protectable "expression." Although the
uncopyrightability of ideas is important in making copyright consistent with First Amendment principles,
one need not invoke separate First Amendment doctrine to resolve the language copyright issue.
' Lowry, supra note 28, at 1296.
63 17 U.S.C. S 102(b) (1994).
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rules."" Therefore, according to this argument, the language is not
copyrightable.
Indeed, a leading dictionary includes a definition of "language" as "a
formal system of signs and symbols (as FOR TRAN [a computer language] or
a calculus in logic) including rules for the formation and transformation of
admissible expressions." 6' The plain terms of the Copyright Act, coupled
with this established definition of "language" in the computer context, can
be cited in support of the view that, no matter how original, computer
languages are not a proper subject of copyright protection.
In Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc.,66 the First
Circuit, although not specifically addressing language copyrightability, took
a similar approach to determining the copyrightability of the menu
command hierarchy of the Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet software. The court held
that the command hierarchy, which also provided key elements for use in
the Lotus macro language, was an uncopyrightable "method of operation."67
If a menu command structure falls within the plain meaning of "method of
operation," as used in the statute, a language may well fall within the plain
meaning of "system."
The Supreme Court, however, was equally divided on the First Circuit's
approach.68 It remains similarly uncertain how the "system" approach would
be resolved. The word "system" is open to multiple potential meanings. A
software application that is not in any sense a language, and that is widely
acknowledged to be copyrightable, may also be characterized as a "system."
For example, the term "accounting system," which describes the idea held
uncopyrightable in Baker v. Selden,69 may equally well, in modern parlance,
refer to a software package7" that all would agree is protected by copyright.
As discussed later in this Article, resolving the question in the XML context
" Lowry, supra note 28, at 1312 (emphasis added).
s MERRAMWEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, at http://www.britanica.com/dictionary (last
visited Aug. 30, 2001) (emphasis added).
49 F.3d 807,34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1014 (1st Cir. 1995), affdby an equallydivided Court, 516 U.S.
233 (1996).
67 49 F.3d at 815.
See 516 U.S. at 233.
69 See Am. Dental Ass'n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass'n, 126 F.3d 977, 981, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1296,
1300 (7th Cir. 1997) (referring to Selden's "accounting system").
' See Coffey v. Dobbs Int'l Servs., Inc., 170 F.3d 323, 325 (2d Cir. 1999) (referring to "a computer
software billing and accounting system").
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depends on defining the relevant "system" or idea and considering how it
corresponds to the expressive aspects of the XML schema.
B. COMPUTER LANGUAGES AS NOT FULLY FIXED
A related but distinct argument against copyrightability of computer
languages, advanced by Marci Hamilton and Ted Sabety, is that holding
languages copyrightable would provide copyright protection for expressions
not yet fixed in a tangible medium of expression, contrary to the Copyright
Act's express requirement."1 For that matter, one could say that language
copyright would treat as copyrighted any potential expression in the
language, even though it has not yet occurred in any medium, tangible or
otherwise.
Hamilton and Sabety point out that computer language copyright could
apply to one of two files: "a list of all possible sentences in that language, or
an expression of its specification.., that fully describes the language." 2 The
first is "likely to be impossible," because all possible sentences in any but the
most simplistic language have not yet been uttered, and the second is
"problematic," because the language specification "is not fixation of the
sentence itself."7 3
Michael Doerr criticizes this argument against copyrightability because
it "presupposes that in order for a programming language to be fixed, all of
the possible sentences that could be formed using the language must also be
fixed."74  Instead, according to Doerr, "if one wished only to obtain
copyright protection for the language itself [as opposed to all possible
sentences], one should be able to fulfill the fixation requirement by simply
fixing the language and the grammar rules for the language in a computer
program utilizing the language.""5
The problem with this opposing view is that it merely shifts the question
from one about fixation to one about infringement. If the language
specification is the original work of authorship that is fixed in a tangible
medium of expression, is that copyright infringed when someone does not
"' Hamilton & Sabety, supra note 38, at 269.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Doerr, supra note 34, at 140.
s Id at 141.
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directly copy the language specification, but merely uses it to create sentences
that have not previously been fixed?
The author of a language specification could assert that unauthorized use
of the language specification constitutes unauthorized reproduction or
unauthorized creation of derivative works.76 In either instance, there would
need to be actual unauthorized copying of at least some portion of the
language specification. At a minimum, "[a] derivative work must incorporate
a protected work in some concrete or permanent 'form.' "" To use a
specification is not necessarily to copy or incorporate it.
For copying of a copyrighted work to be legally actionable, there must
be not only copying but "substantial similarity between the two works.""8
This requirement has also been applied to finding unauthorized creation of
derivative works.79 Determining whether similarity is substantial "presents
one of the most difficult questions in copyright law, and one that is the least
susceptible of helpful generalizations.""
In Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd.,"1 the Fifth Circuit addressed a
contention that Vault had created an unauthorized derivative work when it
copied about thirty characters of Vault's software locking program into
Quaid's, eighty-page lock-cracking program. 2 Pointing out that the two
programs served different purposes, the court held that they were not
substantially similar.8 3 The difference in purpose between a language
specification and sentences written in the language is likely to be even greater
7' 17 U.S.C. SS 106(1)(2) (1994) (stating that the rights to reproduce and prepare derivative works are
the exclusive rights of the copyright owner). Anyone who violates any of the copyright owner's exclusive
rights is an infringer. 17 U.S.C. S 501(a) (1994).
" Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 17680, *3 (9th Cir.
Aug. 5, 1992) (emphasis added). "The examples of derivative works provided by the [Copyright] Act all
physically incorporate the underlying work or works. The Act's legislative history similarly indicates that
.the infringing work must incorporate a portion of the copyrighted work in some form.'" Id. at *4
(citing 1976 U.S. CODECONG. &ADMIN. NEWS 5659,5675) (emphasis added). Accord Ets-Hokin v. Skyy
Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1079 (9th Cir. 2000).
' Eng'g Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1341 (5th Cir. 1994), supplemented
on other grounds, 46 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 1995). Accord 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT S 13.03[A] (2000) [hereinafter NIMMER].
?' See Michael Wurzer, Note, Infringement of the Exclusive Right to Prepare Derivative Works:
Reducing Uncertainty, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1521, 1521 (1989).
8 4 NIMMER, supra note 78, S 13.03[A] at 13-27 (footnote omitted).
Si 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
2 d. at 267-68.
I dL at 268.
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than the difference between two programs. A finding of substantial
similarity, at least under the Vault approach, thus seems unlikely.
This conclusion is reinforced by the more recent decision of the Ninth
Circuit in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.84 The court's decision in
Apple reflects the principle that "more similarity is required when less
protectible matter is at issue."" Taking into account "the limited number of
ways that the basic ideas of the Apple [graphical user interface] can be
expressed differently," as well as a license covering a large part of the
interface, the court held: "[W]e conclude that only 'thin' protection, against
virtually identical copying, is appropriate." 6 Insofar as computer languages
tend to be "idea"-intensive, at the "thin" end of the protectability spectrum,
the principle applied in Apple further suggests that sentences written in a
language are unlikely to be considered unauthorized copies or derivative
works.
Accordingly, even if a computer language specification is fixed, uses of the
language to create previously unfixed sentences may not infringe the
copyright in the specification itself. So far, however, we have considered the
question in the abstract. Actual practice is more complicated and rapidly
changing. Some programming languages, for example, are provided in
software packages that include, and perhaps require, run-time interpreters
and actual code modules.8" Unlicensed copying of such interpreters or
modules, if they are copyrighted, is infringing. Thus, even if a language itself
in principle is uncopyrightable, practical use of it may involve copying of
copyrighted materials. In the next section, we consider language
copyrightability in the specific context of XML-based markup languages.
IV. THE SPECIAL CASE OF XML SCHEMAS
According to W3C's Director, "XML makes it easy for everyone to create
their own tags or entire markup languages."88 Nevertheless, XML schemas
are not entirely self-contained, and they are not necessarily "languages" in a
* 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1184 (1995).
" 4 NIMMER, supra note 78, S 13.03(A) at 13-28.
" 35 F.3d at 1442.
"See Brett Frischmann & Dan Moylan, Tbe Evoking Common Law Doctrine of Copyrigbt Misuse:
A Unified Theory and Its Application to Software, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 865, 905-06 (2000) (describing
compiled and interpreted programs).
u BERNERS-LEE, supra note 10, at 161.
[Vol. 9:63
18
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol9/iss1/3
BLANK ESPERANTO
formal sense. Rather, XML schemas are XML extensions: XML schemas are
used in or with XML documents; an XML parser 9 is required to process an
XML document; and the XML document must substantially conform to the
rules of XML, including the rules that make it possible for various schemas,
with potentially conflicting vocabularies, to coexist and successfully interact
on the Web.9"
Although XML schemas are often called markup languages, they are also
sometimes referred to as "dialects" 9 or "vocabularies"' of XML or as XML
"applications."93 "By definition, a language is a formal system consisting of
three elements: a vocabulary, a syntax, and semantics."94 XML supplies
basic signs and symbols (a partial vocabulary) that interrelate based on a set
of rules (syntax), but leaves meaning (semantics) largely to the schema
author. The XML schema, in turn, has no syntax of its own, but the schema
uses XML's syntax to define a set of markup tags (an extended vocabulary)
and to give them meaning, which may include defining acceptable contents
and values for particular elements and attributes9 -hence, the "Semantic
Web."96
We, thus, may refine the description of XML schemas as "markup
languages" to say that, in a formal sense, the markup language consists not
of the schema alone but of XML as extended by the schema. Documents
written in this language, in turn, must be interpreted by an XML parser that
has access to the literal terms of the schema. These characteristics of XML
schemas raise several questions. First, does the dependence of the XML
schema on XML, a standard of W3C, affect schema "copyrightability"
questions? Second, focusing on the XML schema as potentially
copyrightable in its own right, does the schema's use of syntax from a source
" Any computer program that is supposed to generate or accept sentences in a computer language
requires some kind of parser." Hamilton & Sabety, supra note 38, at 267. The parser "accepts strings of
symbols consistent with the grammar [of a computer language] and rejects those that are grammatically
incorrect." Idl at 266.
90 See BERNERs-LEE, supra note 10, at 161-62.
9 *XML... makes it possible for developers to create their own mutually interoperable dialects of
markup languages, including but not limited to HTML.' ST. LAURENT, supra note 3, at 1.
92 TRAVIS, supra note 2, at 51.
93 CASTRO, supra note 6, at 13.
" Pamela Samuelson, Computer Programs, User Interfaces, and Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act of
1976: A Critique of Lotus v. Paperback, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 334 (Spring 1992). Accord
Stern, supra note 54, at 327.
9' See CASTRO, supra note 6, at 22.
9 See Berners-Lee et al., supra note 5, at 36.
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external to the schema affect the analysis? Third, does the need to load a
literal copy of the XML schema into a computer's memory make a
difference?
A. XML AND W3C
The current specification for XML, as of this writing, is set forth in a
W3C Recommendation, dated October 6,2000, entitled "Extensible Markup
Language (XML) 1.0 (Second Edition)."97 The specification bears a copyright
notice and states that W3C "software licensing rules apply."98 Thus,
although XML is an open standard, W3C apparently maintains that at least
the specification itself is copyrightable.
The W3C software licensing rules state, however, that "[p]ermission to
use, copy, modify, and distribute this software and its documentation, with
or without modification, for any purpose and without fee or royalty is
hereby granted," provided only that the user includes a specified W3C
copyright notice." The W3C rules do not say that the licensee must place
any resulting modifications or works created with XML in the public
domain or make them available to the public on comparable license terms.
Subject to the proviso, the "software" may be used, copied, modified, and
distributed "for any purpose," which includes any commercial purpose.
W3C could have crafted its license to state that XML, or at least the XML
specification, could be used only in conjunction with schemas that were in
the public domain or otherwise freely available. This "viral" model of public
licensing is exemplified by the GNU General Public License (GPL).'"
Under Section 2(a) of the GPL, anyone can modify a work that is licensed
to the public under the GPL, but the person modifying the work must agree
to make the modified work available "to all third parties" under the terms of
the GPL."' Because W3C does not follow the viral licensing model of the
* At http://www.w3.org/TR/2000/REC-xml-20001006 (last visited Aug. 30, 2001).
'l
W3CSofiwareNoticeandLicenseat http://www.w3.org/Consortium/Legal/copyright-software-
19980720 (last visited Aug. 30, 2001).
"o At http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html. "GNU is a recursive acronym for 'GNU's Not Unix';
it is pronounced 'guh-NEW.'" GNU Home Page, at http://www.gnu. org/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2001).
101 GNU GeneralPublic License, Version 2,at http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html (une 1991) (last
visited Aug. 30, 2001). An interesting question, beyond this Article's scope, is whether this term is
enforceable. Licensing terms that seek to leverage the copyright owner's rights under copyright law to
create rights not granted by copyright law may be challenged on grounds of copyright misuse. See
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GPL with respect to XML, W3C's assertion of copyright in the XML
specification appears to have few implications for copyrightability of XML
schemas.0 2
B. USE OF XML SYNTAX
That XML schemas use XML syntax, rather than syntax created by the
schema author, appears unlikely to affect schema copyrightability. Although
this fact makes XML schemas less than complete "languages," the key for
determining copyrightability, in this context, is whether the proposed
subject matter of copyright is a "system" or similarly unprotectable idea.
Nothing in the concept of a "system," either as used in the Copyright Act or
as the term is generally understood, excludes systems that are only
"subsystems." On the contrary, Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act uses the
word "system" along with words such as "procedure" and "process," neither
of which suggests completeness.
To be sure, an XML schema may define one tag or one hundred.
Whether to call it a "system," or even a "procedure" or "process," may
depend on it possessing more than de minimis content. But a schema with
de minimis content might not qualify for copyright protection anyway,
because it might lack sufficient originality. Single words and short phrases
are not copyrightable.0 3 That XML schemas are something less than
complete languages does not establish that they are not ideas.
Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 977, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1846, 1852 (4th Cir. 1990)
(stating that public policy forbids the use of copyright "to secure an exclusive right ... not granted" by
copyright); accord Practice Mgt. Info. Corp. v. AMA, 121 F.3d 516, 520, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1780 (9th
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 933 (1997), modifiedon other grounds, 133 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 524 U.S. 952 (1998).
' W3C states that its software licensing terms are designed to be "no more restrictive than GPL,"
W3C Software Notice and License, supra note 99, but they lack GPL's viral aspect. Conceivably W3C
could assert that XML schemas lacking the specified W3C copyright notice were unauthorized derivative
works, but such claims seem unlikely from a practical standpoint given W3C's apparent desire to maintain
XML as an open standard.
103 See Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067, 1072, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1593, 1597 (2d Cir.
1992)("[Slingle words or short phrases ... do not exhibit the minimal creativity required for copyright
protection."); 37 C.F.R. S 202.1(a) (prohibiting copyright registration of "words and short phrases such
as names, titles and slogans").
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C. COPYING OF XML SCHEMAS
Files created in any programming language (other than machine language)
either must be compiled and linked to create object code or they must be
used in conjunction with an interpreter."° Much of the discussion in the
existing literature about language copyright assumes, at least implicitly, that
the issue is whether one person can create a compiler or interpreter, using
different code, for a language that another person claims to own. 05 The
compiler or interpreter is understood to be copyrightable.'" If the language
is not copyrightable, however, competing compilers and interpreters for that
language (based on different code) may be created and used without
infringement.
XML markup languages present a different situation. An XML schema
together with XML defines a markup language in which XML documents
can be written. For an XML parser to interpret such documents, however,
the parser must have full access to the schema. Thus, a file setting forth the
schema must be copied into the memory of a computer at some step in the
process. XML schemas may be stored on the same system as the XML
document (in the same file or a separate file) or on "public" servers.' Either
way, however, they need to be loaded into memory, and thus copied,108 to
make the XML document ultimately readable.
The parser's need for access to the XML schema as part of, or together
with, the XML document makes the second argument against language
copyrightability-that copyright protection for a language would protect
unfixed expressions, or (as suggested above) that use of a language specifica-
tion is not infringement-insufficient to dispose of copyrightability in the
XML schema context. The reason is that the user of an XML schema is not
merely writing sentences in the language and using an independently-created
compiler or interpreter, which is likely to contain copies of only relatively
small portions of the expression that is contained in the language specifica-
1 See Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 87, at 905-06 (explaining methods of translation of source
code into object code).
s See, e.g., Doerr, supra note 34, at 133; Lowry, supra note 28, at 1339.
10 See Lowry, supra note 28, at 1303 (explaining that computer programs that translate high-level
computer language into lower-level language are copyrightable).
, See CASTRO, supra note 6, at 40.
*" See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Cormputer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1458, 1465
(9th Cir. 1993) (copying a computer file into memory is potentially infringing).
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tion. Rather, the user of the XML schema is writing sentences that can only
create a usable XML document if the XML schema itself, which is fully
fixed, is also fully copied.
Although one could try to write a different but "compatible" schema file
for a given XML-based markup language, this file is quite likely to be
substantially similar to the original schema file. This is so because the
schema-unlike a compiler or an interpreter-is little more than a functional
language specification, and because an XML schema is sharply constrained
by XML itself. If the two files were actually to define, in a mutually
compatible manner, the same schema, they could differ only in immaterial,
arbitrary ways, such as by changing the order of some of their contents.
For all these reasons, use of someone else's XML schema ordinarily will
involve copying a fixed work (the schema) in a way, and to an extent, that
use of someone else's programming language with an independently-
developed compiler or interpreter does not. That is, an independently-
developed compiler or interpreter, although perhaps copying isolated
elements of a language specification, need not contain extensive copying of
the language specification or of any other compiler or interpreter for that
language. Using an independently-developed compiler or interpreter, one
can execute a program written in the language without ever substantially
copying someone else's work. An XML parser cannot, however, process an
XML document written in the markup language defined by a particular
schema without fully copying the schema-someone's work of author-
ship-into a computer's memory.
Hamilton and Sabety's point about fixation, or the related point about
infringement noted above, is apt when applied to use of an independently-
developed, non-infringing compiler or interpreter. The fixation point is less
relevant in the XML schema context because the infringement argument
does not depend on showing that sentences expressed using the language are
infringing. Rather, there is likely to be substantial literal copying, otherwise
sufficient to give rise to infringement, of the XML schema itself when it is
loaded along with the XML document."9  If the XML schema is
"o9 We may assume, for purposes of this discussion, that the schema is sufficiently original to be an
otherwise protectable expression. If the schema is derived from common terms or merely adapts a pre-
existing data model, there may be a question of originality. The current focus, however, is on whether
an XML schema that otherwise constitutes an original work of authorship is nevertheless unprotectable
as an uncopyrightable idea.
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uncopyrightable, then the basis for this conclusion most likely will be found
not in the fixation argument, but in the schema's nature as a "system" or
similarly uncopyrightable idea. Such a finding needs to show that, when it
comes to XML, the schema is the system.
V. THE WORK AND THE IDEA
Under Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act, the "idea" expressed by a
work of authorship is uncopyrightable "regardless of the form in which it is
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in [an otherwise protected]
work."11 Copyright law further provides: "[W]hen an idea can be expressed
in very few ways, copyright law does not protect that expression, because
doing so would confer a defacto monopoly over the idea. In such cases idea
and expression are said to be merged.". 1 The uncopyrightability of the idea
thus trumps the copyrightability of the expression.
Like the similarly broad and foundational doctrine of fair use, the
principle that ideas are not copyrightable under United States law is traceable
to a line of decisional authority that began well over a century ago."' The
uncopyrightability of ideas, even when they are embodied in otherwise
copyrightable works of authorship, is "[p]art of the information ethos in the
United States that facts and ideas cannot be owned, suppressed, is censored,
or regulated .... "113 This doctrine is basic not only to the ability to express
ideas, but also to the ability to read and otherwise receive them.114 The
doctrine thus goes to the heart of the constitutional purpose of copyright,
.10 17 U.S.C. S 102(b) (1994). The same is true of any "procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery" embodied in the work. Id.
. Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Leadership Software, Inc., 12 F.3d 527, 533, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1747,
1750 (5th Cir. 1994). Accord Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161,
1163 (2d Cir. 1991) (-The fundamental copyright principle that only the expression of an idea and not the
idea itself is protectable has produced a corollary maxim that even expression is not protected in those
instances where there is only one or so few ways of expressing an idea that protection of the expression
would effectively accord protection to the idea itself.") (emphasis added). But see Apple Computer, Inc.
v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1444, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d 1086, 1093 (9th Cir. 1994) ("When an idea and its
expression are indistinguishable, or 'merged,' the expression will only be protectedagainst nearly identical
copying.") (emphasis added), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1184 (1995).
112 See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (originating the idea-expression dichotomy); Folsom
v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (originating the fair use doctrine).
113 JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 11 (2001).
14 See id.
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which is "[t]o promote the Progress of Science, "115 and likewise enables
copyright to coexist with the First Amendment's guarantee of free expres-
sion." 6 Moreover, it gives effect to the constitutional and statutory
distinction between copyright and patent, as well as the legislative scheme for
establishing patentability." 7
The idea-expression dichotomy, and the merger doctrine that flows from
it, are sufficiently fundamental to copyright law in the United States that
they have been largely immune to the tendency in copyright legislation of
the last century to adopt more detailed statutory provisions that reflect
political compromises among existing copyright industries."' Because the
merger doctrine has not been defined in detailed provisions authored or
influenced by particular copyright interests, the courts retain a relatively
broad compass to apply the doctrine to new technology.
Courts have held that the merger doctrine is "particularly applicable" to
subject matter involving abstract rules, such as games and contests." 9 On
this basis, for example, the Ninth Circuit held that the merger doctrine
applied to "the expression of the rules of... game manuals" when the author
had been "unable to distinguish the expression of the rules from the idea of
the rules themselves. " 2 ' The merger doctrine also played a key role in
denying copyright protection to Apple Computer for significant aspects of
its graphical user interface.' Because, as outlined above, use of an XML
schema requires substantial literal copying of expression, the merger doctrine
is pivotal here as well.'
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. 8.
116 U.S. CONST. amend. I; see Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556
(1984).
"1 See Baker, 101 U.S. at 102-03.
m See generally LITMAN, supra note 113, at 35-69.
n Allen v. Academic Games League of Am., Inc., 89 F.3d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1996).
12 Ili
121 SeeApple Computer, 35 F.3d at 1444.
1 Edward Samuels suggests that "[miany of the traditional examples of [unprotected ideas, systems,
and the like] are actually more properly viewed as examples of the works of utility doctrine .
EDWARD SAMUELs, THE ILLUSTRATED STORY OF COPYRIGHT 188 (2000). Samuels states:
[A] treatise on relativity or perspective or accounting creates rights in the words used
to explain the principles, but doesn't give any exclusive rights in the use of the
principles themselves. These examples could all be explained either because the
principles are to some extent "functional," and therefore not protected under the
works of utility doctrine, or because they are "ideas," separate and apart from any
description of the principles.
Id at 189. The works of utility doctrine plainly does not, however, preclude copyright protection for
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Does an XML schema embody a language system, subsystem, or other
unprotected category, such as a procedure or process, that copyright law
treats as an "idea" for purposes of the idea-expression dichotomy? If so, does
this system "merge" with the expression of the schema, so as to render the
schema uncopyrightable, even though it contains original expression that
otherwise would be protectable? The answers depend in significant part on
how the idea associated with the schema is defined. No one schema is the
only way to express the idea, generally, of an XML-based markup language.
Nor is any one likely to be the only way to express the idea of an XML-
based markup language relating to the general subject matter of that schema
(such as the imaginary markup language outlined earlier relating to mixed
drinks). If the idea is defined in such broad terms, merger will not occur.
If the idea is defined more narrowly, however, the result may well be
different. This Article suggests that, at least for a functional work like an
XML schema, an approach more compatible with basic copyright principles
is a two-step process. Step One is to characterize, at the lowest level of
abstraction above the work itself, the idea (here, the particular system)
associated with a given expression (here, an XML schema or portion
thereof). Step Two is to determine whether one could make substantial
changes in the expression that would not substantially change the idea (here,
again, the system) or compromise the idea's functionality, thus also changing
the idea. If no expressive changes can be identified that would leave intact
the idea's functionality, or if the proponent of copyright protection
acknowledges that there are no such expressive changes, then the idea and
expression are, according to such an approach, "merged."'23
computer programs merely because such programs are functional. Cf id. at 144 (computer programs are
protected by copyright). It would seem to follow that the functionality of computer languages is
insufficient, by itself, to deprive them of copyright protection, since functional computer languages are
at least as "expressive" as functional computer programs.
" Cf. Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236 (3d Cir. 1986) ("[7be
purpose orfunction ofa utilitarian work would be the work's idea, and everything that is not necessary to that
purpose orffunction would be part of the expression of the idea.") (emphasis in original). In Welan, the court
concluded that the structure of a particular computer program was not necessary to its function and thus
was copyrightable expression. See id at 1239.
Whelan has been criticized for extending copyright protection by focusing on the overall "work's
idea" rather than more specific ideas within the work, which may be more likely to merge with particular
expressions. See Computer Assoc., Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 705, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281 (2d
Cir. 1992) ("As we have already noted, a computer program's ultimate function or purpose is the
composite result of interacting subroutines. Since each subroutine is itself a program, and thus, may be
said to have its own 'idea,' Whelan's general formulation that a program's overall purpose equates with
[Vol. 9:63
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For example, in Step One, Happy Hour Markup Language could be
characterized, at least in part, as a system for marking up Web pages and
other documents relating to mixed drinks in a way that specifies elements of
the document that contain drink categories, drink names, ingredient types,
ingredient quantities, and similar information so that search engines and
software agents can locate and process these elements across a wide range of
documents that use the system.124
In Step Two, one would determine whether one could make a substantial
change in the expression of the schema that defines HHML-for example,
a change in element names or allowable attributes-that would not
substantially change the system or compromise its functionality. Because of
the nature of XML schemas and their dependence on XML syntax,
substantial changes (e.g., adopting different element names or allowable
attributes, and not merely reversing the order of some of the declarations) in
the expression almost certainly would compromise the system's functional-
ity.
Indeed, a key part of any XML schema's functionality, as outlined in Step
One, is to make it possible to locate and process the defined elements across
many different documents using the system, without using a translator or
other additional steps. One could change the expression in ways that would
result in different systems covering the same subject matter, but they would
be just that: different systems. This fact indicates that, if the approach
outlined here and below is correct, XML schemas ordinarily will "merge"
with the systems they embody. The basis for this approach, and possible
objections, are addressed in the pages that follow.
the program's idea is descriptively inadequate.-).
Here, the issue is not copyright protection for non-literal elements, such as a program's "structure."
Nor is it identifying non-literal "expression." Rather, the problem is to determine whether and when
literal expression (a schema) merges with an idea. The test outlined above draws on Whelan's observation
that changing the functionality of a utilitarian work is a change of idea, while at the same time
acknowledging, as observed by the Altai court, that there may be multiple ideas in a work and multiple
levels of abstraction at which an idea can be examined. See 982 F.2d at 705, 706.
124 The system, undoubtedly, could be characterized in greater detail, but still at a level of abstraction
above the expression. For present purposes, however, the characterization above should suffice.
2001]
27
Phillips: XML Schemas and Computer Language Copyright: Filling in the Blank
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2001
. INTELL. PROP. L.
A. THE MEANING OF "IDEA"
At the outset, any analysis that delves into the merger doctrine must
confront the dichotomy between expression and idea. How to apply this
dichotomy is not necessarily obvious. 2 After all, we generally access "ideas"
through "expressions" of them. We cannot say what an idea is without in
some sense expressing it. We may doubt whether ideas can be said to exist
other than in the form of expressions. One reason for these concerns, no
doubt, is that "idea" has various meanings. Because differences in these
meanings can cause confusion, examining the term may help clarify the issue.
For purposes of the idea-expression dichotomy as set forth in the
Copyright Act, "idea" really means "idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery .. ."126 As discussed
above, the most apt of these words for describing an XML schema or other
computer language is probably "system." The word "system" is not, of
course, a synonym for "idea" in all respects, but "system" falls on the "idea"
side of the idea-expression divide.
What places it there, and what "idea, procedure, process, system," and the
other specified "idea-side" words all have in common for copyright purposes,
is that they are all abstractions from a given expression. As Learned Hand
pointed out in another key early copyright decision, Nicbols v. Universal
Pictures Corp.,"7 if we want to say that a given expression, X, represents a
particular idea, Y, then Y is an abstraction we construct from X. 2' The
abstraction Y is, of course, itself an "expression" of the idea, system, etc., but
it is ordinarily different from X and is not the direct expression of the
author. 129
"' See Leslie A. Kurtz, Speaking to the Ghost: Idea and Expression in Copyright, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1221, 1222 (1993) ("The words idea and expression remain strangely undefined, terms[ ] without content,
bottles without wine."); Edward Samuels, The Idea-Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 56 TENN. L.
REV. 321, 323 (1989) ("Some commentators who have studied the idea-expression dichotomy in the
greatest detail have criticized it...").
126 17 U.S.C. S 102(b) (1994). Baker v. Selden used the word "art," presumably because, in defining
patentable subject matter, the Patent Act used the word "art," rather than "process," until 1952. See
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981).
"7 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
ig d. at 121.
1, Whether Y or something like it was also somehow floating around in the mind of the author
before he or she expressed X may be an interesting psychological question, but it makes no difference for
copyright analysis.
[Vol. 9:63
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The word "idea" can be traced to the Greek t8ea. 13° For Plato, an Idea or
Form was the essence of a thing (e.g., chairness) as opposed to a particular
instance of the thing (e.g., a particular chair).' The Form was perfect; the
particular instance of the thing was only an imperfect approximation of the
Form.13 Ever since, philosophers have given considerable attention to
whether and where ideas "exist." '  Whereas Plato placed ideas in a world of
their own, Aristotle denied that abstract entities had any independent
existence.'34 More recently, "concept" (which appears along with "idea" in
the Copyright Act's litany of exclusions) has become "the modern replace-
ment for the older term idea, stripped of the latter's imagist associations, and
thought of as more intimately bound up with language." 3 '
Although "idea" and "concept" have other meanings,"' a popular
dictionary includes a definition of "concept" as "an abstract or generic idea
generalized from particular instances."' 37 Reflecting this sense of the word,
the idea-expression dichotomy in copyright law clearly echoes the classical
search for essences, which must be achieved, however, through the
130 "Idea," in Philosophy Pages, at http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/i.htm (last visited Aug. 30,
2001); FARHANG ZABEEH, UNIVERSALS: A NEW LOOK AT AN OLD PROBLEM 3 (1966). The suggestion
here is not that copyright law depends on philosophical theory, but that the meaning of "idea" as we use
it in copyright analysis is significantly influenced by our philosophical tradition, making an ever-so-brief
excursion into that tradition potentially helpful in understanding how copyright analysis applies to the
issue at hand.
.. See "form," in THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 315 (2d ed. 1995).
,,2 See id.; cf "idea," in MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 65 ("la: a
transcendent entity that is a real pattern of which existing things are imperfect representations").
13 See "abstraction," in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 3 (1995). For example, the
existence of the abstract "idea" of a triangle was questioned because, by hypothesis, it encompasses all
particular kinds of triangle (equilateral, scalene, etc.) but at the same time is none of these particular kinds
of triangle. Il; see "abstract entity," in THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 131,
at 3.
14 See "abstract entity," in THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 131, at 3.
1.. See "concept," in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY, supra note 133, at 146.
"3 For example, in the present context, "idea" may also refer to an inchoate or incompletely-formed
expression. See "idea," in MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 65 ("3b: an
indefinite or unformed conception"). If one thinks before one speaks, one has "in mind" the general
nature of what one is about to say, and we might call this mental image the "idea" that one is "trying" to
express. In this sense, the idea precedes the expression, perhaps in a causal sense. The author had the
"idea" for this Article before writing this Article. The author also had "ideas" for particular points in the
Article before expressing them. Such ideas become accessible, however, if at all, only through the
expressions in which they are eventually embodied, and they may or may not correspond to the "ideas"
that copyright does not protect.
,. See "concept," in MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 65 (definition 2).
This definition roughly corresponds to the definition of "idea" as "the central meaning or chief end of a
particular action or situation." Id (definition 6).
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construction of abstractions.' That is, because copyright doctrine
presupposes that idea and expression are dichotomous, and because that which
is given directly in the expression is part of the expression, "ideas" as we
know them for copyright purposes cannot be something that is given
directly, but are essences of what is given, which in today's terms we think
of as abstractions that we construct. The construction of these abstractions
occurs as part of copyright analysis, in which we define or characterize some
aspect of the expression being analyzed. The case law confirms that
identifying the idea we say is "embodied" in an expression involves this
process of constructive abstraction.139
Thus, if we are presented with a description of a particular chair, we may
look at the chair and state the idea "chairness" even though, looking at the
chair, we do not see chairness.'" Stating the idea involves specifying some
features (e.g., capacity to support someone while seated) and ignoring others
(e.g., color).141 Whether abstract entities in any sense "exist" outside the
human mind, or even within the mind of a work's author, can safely remain
in the realm of metaphysics or perhaps psychology.142 Likewise, we need not
"I Cf I ALLEN, TH-m DIALOGUEs OF PLATO: EUTHYPHRO, APOLOGY, CRITO, MENO, GORGIAS,
MENEXENUS 37-38 (R.H. Allen, trans., 1984) ("Socrates' identification, or connection, of things which
are linguistically distinct [as representing ideas] is unintelligible without the notion of essence..
PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 350-51 (Benjamin Jowett trans., 1941) (essence corresponds to truth).
139 See, e.g., Computer Assoc., Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281 (2d
Cir. 1992); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121, 7 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 84 (2d Cir. 1930).
10 Cf D.M. ARMSTRONG, UNIVERSALS: AN OPINIONATED INTRODUCTION 6 (1989) ("Antisthenes
said to Plato: 'I can see the horse, Plato, but not horseness.' ").
141 The end product of this process will itself be an expression of the concept-a kind of meta-
expression-because the only way the concept becomes accessible (except perhaps to the person conceiving
it in inchoate form in that person's mind) is through expression. Likewise, identifying a procedure,
process, system, method of operation, principle, or discovery embodied in an expression involves meta-
expression, because we also need to express our identification of the procedure, process, etc. These meta-
expressions, however, preserve the dichotomy because they are not directly given by the expression under
analysis, but instead are expressions of abstract ideas we associate with the expressions under analysis.
42 As David R. Koepsell observes, one need not resolve the differences between philosophical realism
and idealism to adopt a satisfactory "ontology," a term he uses to describe the appropriate classificatory
framework, for examining intellectual property issues relating to software:
An acceptance of the use of common terms which refer to objects commonly
understood, and the relations which may exist between those terms and our
experiences, is all we need in order to categorize the world. Developing a common-
sense ontology requires an admission that we cannot satisfactorily answer the
ultimate metaphysical questions regarding what may be real and what may not be
real. Rather, it requires only an acceptance of the facts of common experience,
without regard to their deeper reality.
DAVID R. KOEPSELL, THE ONTOLOGY OF CYBERSPACE: LAW, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE FUTURE OF
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try to solve the various other philosophical and linguistic problems
associated with universals.'43 For purposes of applying copyright doctrine,
what matters is whether one can find a satisfactory way, consistent with
ordinary language and common sense, to construct an abstraction-"idea,"
"concept," "system," or the like-that provides a satisfactory sense of the
relevant "essence" of the expression.'
B. LEVELS OF ABSTRACTION
Plato's theory of ideas attracted considerable criticism, even in his own
time, and one of the most important criticisms arose from the observation
that the number of universals was potentially infinite. 4 The modern
version of this problem is that we can associate any number of concepts with
a particular thing and any number of ideas with a particular expression. A
particular chair may be an instance of the idea "chairness," but it may also
be an instance of the idea "furniture." Defining the applicable idea, or the
applicable level of abstraction, becomes a key issue.'46
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 24-25 (2000).
143 Some philosophers believe that Wittgenstein "solved" the problem of universals by exposing it as
a philosophical confusion. See, e.g., Benford Bambrough, Universals and Family Resemblances, in THE
PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALS 266 (Andrew B. Schoedinger ed. 1992); ZABEEH, supra note 130, at 43. We
need not address whether every use of a particular term entails a common "something," however, to
recognize that, in a particular given context such as a specific case, subject to analysis under the principles
of copyright law, it may make sense to refer to an abstract idea or concept associated with a particular
expression. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPIUCAL INVESTIGATIONS S 68 (G.E.M. Anscombe
trans., 2d ed. 1958) (even if "number" can be used in various ways, "I can give the concept 'number' rigid
limits... that is, use the word 'number' for a rigidly limited concept") (emphasis on "can" in original;
other emphasis added).
1" Referring to the process as one of constructive abstraction does not imply that the abstraction is
somehow arbitrary. On the contrary, we must find abstractions that fit the expression. For purposes of
copyright analysis, however, we need not adopt a complete theory of what such abstractions really "are."
' See "Plato," in CAMBRIDGEDICTIONARYOFPHILOSOPHY 712 (2d ed. 1995). For the modern view
of this criticism, see NELSON GOODMAN, THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALS (1956):
[O]ur platonist admits all classes of classes of atoms, and by this single step he
welcomes into his universe 2", or over two billion, additional entities. And he has
no thought of stopping there. He also admits all classes of classes of atoms, and so on
ad infinitum, climbing through an explosively expanding universe towards a
prodigiously teeming Platonic Heaven.
Ia at 19, quoted in ZABEEH, supra note 130, at 24 n.9.
" Unfortunately, despite focusing on "ontology" and repeatedly discussing the idea-expression
dichotomy, Koepsell states: "I am not interested in pursuing here the nature of ideas. It suffices for the
pursuit of a commonsense ontology of intellectual property law to note that an idea may be held and not
expressed." KOEPSELL, supra note 142, at 121. In other words, an idea, as opposed to an expression, is
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In Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.,"' the Second Circuit described an
approach to the idea-expression dichotomy that has become known as the
"'abstractions' test,"'48 although, as discussed below, it is more of a non-test.
The court wrote:
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number
of patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as
more and more of the incident is left out. The last may
perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what
the play is about, and at times might consist only of its title;
but there is a point in this series of abstractions where they
are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright
could prevent the use of his "ideas," to which, apart from
their expression, his property is never extended. 49
This approach is something less than a "test" because the court went on
to say, in the next sentence: "Nobody has ever been able to fix that
boundary, and nobody ever can."' Rather than proposing a test for fixing
the "point" in the "series of abstractions where they are no longer
protected," the court simply observed that the line needed to be drawn to
decide the case and applied an "I-know-it-when-I-see it" approach, conclud-
ing: "Whatever may be the difficulties a priori, we have no question on
which side of the line this case falls."'' On this basis, the court held that the
two works in question were not substantially similar at a level of abstraction
sufficiently specific to be viewed as expression rather than idea.'
More than sixty years later, in Computer Associates International, Inc. v.
Altai, Inc.,' the Second Circuit incorporated the Nichols "abstractions"
approach into its so-called "abstraction-filtration-comparison" test for
identifying copyrightable expression, if any, in a computer program's
that which is "not expressed." To the extent this observation is true, it is true by definition; that which
is not expressed is not an expression. We still need to know where "idea" ends and "expression" begins.
45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
1,8 Computer Assoc., Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693,706,55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281 (2d Cir. 1992).
"9 Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121.
IS0 la
.. Id at 122.
152 See id
... Altai, 982 F.2d 693.
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"structure") or non-literal elements.' Under this approach, a program is
examined at each level of abstraction. "[A]t "progressively higher levels of
abstraction, the functions of higher-level modules conceptually replace the
implementations of those modules..., until finally, one is left with nothing
but the ultimate function of the program."'
Next, one follows "a 'successive filtering method' for separating
protectable expression from non-protectable material," in which one
examines "the structural components at each level of abstraction to
determine whether their particular inclusion at that level was 'idea' " or
otherwise nonprotectable by copyright.5 6 The object is to "sift out all non-
protectable material."' Finally:
Left with a kernel, or possibly kernels, of creative expression
after following this process of elimination, the court's last
step would be to compare this material with the structure of
an allegedly infringing program. The result of this compari-
son will determine whether the protectable elements of the
programs at issue are substantially similar so as to warrant a
finding of infringement.'
The problem with this strategy for harvesting protectable "kernels" is
that, like Nichols, it provides no principled basis for separating the wheat of
expression from the chaff of ideas. Specifically, the approach gives no basis
for determining the level of abstraction or, as Nichols puts it, the "point in
[the] series of abstractions,"'59 at which "expression" becomes "idea."" 6 The
approach presupposes that there are relatively "low" levels of abstrac-
tion-i.e., relatively concrete statements of the work-that are not suffi-
ciently removed from the expression to be "ideas," so that similarity between
two works at those levels would establish infringement despite the absence
1'4 Id. at 706.
"' Id. at 707 (quoting Steven R. Englund, Note, Idea, Process, or Protected Expression?: Determining
the Scope of Copyright Protection of the Structure of Computer Programs, 88 MICH. L. REV. 866, 897-98
(1990)).
'56 Altai, 982 F.2d at 707.
1 7 Id. at 706.
158 Id.
"s 45 F.2d at 121.
C 6f Samuels, supra note 125, at 343 (C[I]f the abstraction at issue is not determined by the characters
or plot as developed, how does one determine the level of an abstraction upon which to focus?").
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of literal identity. But such an approach does not show how (other than by
knowing it when we see it) we decide the level of abstraction at which to
make this dispositive comparison, or above which similarity is in the idea
only.
Both Altai and Nichols suffer from a serious further problem as well.
They both view the varying "abstractions" that constitute the characteriza-
tion of a work's "idea" as merely more generalized ways of expressing the
work. Perhaps the word "idea" lends itself to this understanding, but words
such as "system" may not. Characterizing the "system" embodied in a work
is not necessarily a matter of finding a more general way of expressing the
work, but instead entails identifying properties of the work that define its
"systematic" functionality.61 Here, the relevant properties center on the role
of the schema as part of a system that itself serves as a means of expression.
We need not abstract all possible aspects of the schema to recognize it as such
a system and to treat the system as unprotectable. To be sure, an abstracting
process is required, but that which is being abstracted is only one aspect of
the work-the aspect that allows us to call it a (functional) system.
In Nichols, the court suggested that the highest level of abstraction of a
play was its title.'62 The title, of course, does not necessarily capture or
encompass the full range of more specific ideas in the play. Rather, it usually
focuses on a particular idea or aspect of the work selected by the author.'63
When we refer to a "system," the use of this term to describe the kind of
concept involved directs us to focus on particular aspects of the work relating
to the work's functionality. In this context, it is worth noting that Altai's
adoption of the Nichols approach in the software context overlooks the
Nichols court's emphasis that its approach was "especially" suitable for a
161 That an "idea" or "system" is an abstraction does not mean that all abstractions from an expression
are excluded from protection. Paraphrasing, for example, can be viewed as an abstraction, as can, perhaps,
translation. An abstraction from an expression defines an unprotected aspect of the expression only if the
abstraction is a characterization of the embodied "idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery." 17 U.S.C. S 102(b) (1994).
16, 45 F.2d at 121.
16 For that matter, in rare instances, the title may even contain more of certain kinds of expression
than the work itself. For example, in the 1981 Jean-Jacques Annaud film "Quest for Fire," which takes
place 80,000 years ago, the cave-people characters speak no known language, but rather use languages that
were invented for the film. Although the characters are quite expressive in other ways, the only
identifiable modern words in the work are the three that make up the title.
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play,'" which is not a comparably functional work. As seen below, the
functional aspect is key to defining a "system."
C. RETURNING TO BAKER V SELDEN
To see how the approach suggested in this Article is derived and how it
would address these problems, we may set to one side the 1992 Altai decision
and the 1930 Nichols decision and return to the Supreme Court's 1880
decision in Baker v. Selden." s The decision in Baker, after all, provides the
doctrinal foundation for the idea-expression dichotomy that is now codified
in the Copyright Act." As we are about to see, it also addresses the key
issues in the context of a clearly functional work.
Baker involved a book about an accounting system. '67 The Court
acknowledged that the "description of the art" in the book was "entitled to
the benefit of copyright ... ."" The book did not, however, consist entirely
of the introductory essay that contained this description." 9  Rather,
"annexed" to the book were "certain forms or blanks, consisting of ruled
lines, and headings, illustrating the system and showing how it is to be used
and carried out in practice."7' The Court held that the specific "system
explained in [Selden's] book," namely one keyed to Selden's particular "ruled
lines and headings, or ruled lines and headings made and arranged on
substantially the same system. . .," was unprotectable by copyright.'
The "art" or idea in Baker could have been defined, at a relatively high
level of abstraction, as an accounting system. At an only partially-lower
level of abstraction, it could have been defined as a double-entry accounting
system. Selden did not claim copyright at either level of abstraction. Rather,
he asserted protection only for his specific system, which Selden himself
contended no one else could use "without using substantially the same ruled
lines and headings which he has appended to his books in illustration of
164 Id.
16 101 U.S. 99 (1880).
6 See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (citing Baker).
' Baker, 101 U.S. at 100.
'6" 1id at 105.
169 See ida
17 1kL at 100.
11 Id. at 101.
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it."' In holding, effectively, that Selden's particular expression of the grid
merged with the idea, making the grid along with the idea unprotectable, the
Court viewed the unprotected idea at what appears to have been the lowest
available level of abstraction. In doing so, the Court focused on the work's
functionality as a system.
Although the Baker Court did not directly address the possibility that it
could have defined the unprotected "art" or idea at a level of abstraction that
was higher, and thus farther removed from the particular work, the Court
emphasized that protection for an art must be found, if at all, in patent
law."7 3 Given this point, one explanation for the Court's use of the lowest
level of abstraction is that allowing protection of a functional idea that can
be attributed to a work at any level of abstraction would amount to a patent
grant," 4 with effective "claims" of undetermined scope. Under this
approach, copyright protection for an idea in a functional work that takes
the form of a "system" must be denied at the lowest level of abstraction; if
denied at that level, it will be denied at any higher level.'
The Court's emphasis on the work's functional aspect is seen in its
statement that, "in using the art [described in the book], the ruled lines and
headings of accounts must necessarily be used as incident to it."176 One could
substantially vary the expressive aspects of the essay that described the "art"
or idea, while still describing an idea that, even at the lowest level of
abstraction, can be recognized as the same idea. One could not, however,
substantially vary the expressive aspects of the ruled lines and headings of
accounts without defeating the functionality of that idea-they "must
necessarily be used as incident to it"-and thus effectively varying the idea."
This is the sense in which the ruled lines and headings are the unprotected
idea.
172 Baker, 101 U.S. 100, at 101.
173 Id. at 102. The Court expressed this view in strong language: "To give to the author of the book
an exclusive property in the art described therein, when no examination of its novelty has ever been
officially made, would be a surprise and a fraud upon the public. That is the province of letters-patent,
not of copyright." Id.
174 See id at 102-03.
'ts Drafters of patent claims are quite familiar with this logical relationship. Narrower (more specific)
claims are more likely to be granted, but broader (more general) claims cover more ground. The narrower
claim may survive denial of the broader claim, but the converse is not true. See generally In re Hiniker
Co., 150 F.3d 1362,1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (-the name of the game is the claim").
176 Baker, 101 U.S. at 104 (emphasis added).
177 See id
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To return to the classical concept of ideas with which we began the
discussion of the idea-expression dichotomy, the word "essence" in
contemporary usage still conveys, in the present context, the notion of
"essence" as a property of a thing that cannot be changed without causing the
thing to lose its identity. 7" If the particular expressive content of a work that
embodies a functional system cannot be changed without causing that work
to lose its identity as an embodiment of that system, then this particular
expressive content is the work's "essence," and thus "merges with" the
work's relevant "idea."
Just as Selden's "art," in the most concrete sense, was a system keyed to
the use of his particular ruled lines and headings or substantially similar ones,
an XML schema, as an idea or system, depends on the use of the particular
vocabulary set forth in it. One could describe the system represented by the
schema differently in an essay while recognizably referring to the same
system. One could also select, for inclusion in the schema, a different
vocabulary to refer to similar concepts, but then one would not be using the
same system. Changing the vocabulary, or making almost any other
substantial change in the literal expression of the schema, would almost
surely defeat the functionality of the system. Rather, one would be creating
a new system, which might or might not be functional. In other words, in
the same way that Selden's arrangement of lines and headings was his system,
the XML schema is the system it embodies.179 If this analysis is correct, XML
schemas will always, or almost always, be uncopyrightable.
A good test of this approach is to consider whether it explains why the
source code for an application program ordinarily does not merge with the
idea and therefore is copyrightable. In other words, the approach should
indicate how an idea can be associated with more than one expression. For
example, just as an XML schema is a language system (or subsystem) that
'7$ See "essence," in MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 65 ("Ic: the
properties or attributes by means of which something can be placed in its proper class or identified as
being what it is"); ZABEEH, supra note 130, at 12 ('Aristotle argues that ... the essence of a thing is that
property which cannot be changed without the thing losing its identity").
" If the work of authorship as a whole (the entire schema) merges with the "system" or other idea
that it embodies, there is no need to consider whether pieces of expression within the work merge with
the additional ideas they may also embody. This is so because, as discussed above, uncopyrightability of
an idea trumps any copyrightability of expressions in which it may be embodied. See supra notes 110-11
and accompanying text. On the other hand, as suggested by Altai, a work as a whole may embody
multiple ideas, and if there is no overall merger, particular expressions within the work may nevertheless
merge and thus be uncopyrightable. See supra note 123.
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enables expression, a text-editing program can be viewed as a "system" (or
subsystem) that enables expression. One might say that a particular text-
editing program expresses "the idea that only it expresses," in which case
(arbitrary) merger may appear to be achieved. We may, however, reasonably
exclude such circular or implausible characterizations of the idea.
Rather, for purposes of copyright analysis, we must find a way to
characterize the system in functional terms (as the Supreme Court did with
Selden's system) that is both linguistically plausible and no more abstract
than necessary as a matter of ordinary language. One possibility for a
particular text editor would be to say that it is a system that enables the user
to create and save files in, say, ASCII format. Clearly, one could substan-
tially change the code (expression) without needing to change this character-
ization and without impairing the system's functionality (thus changing the
system). If there were code that could not be changed without preventing
the system from functioning as an editor for ASCII-formatted files, or that
is necessary to the functionality achieved by a given subroutine, this
particular code probably would merge with the idea. Otherwise, however,
the code is only one of many, potential expressions of the idea and is,
accordingly, copyrightable. 8 °
D. RECENT MERGER DECISIONS
Although Baker v. Selden and the principles behind it, which are codified
in the current Copyright Act, seem to support the analysis outlined above,
current case law has not yet applied a consistent set of principles to such
issues, leaving the outcome far from certain. Thus, unless the holdings of
recent decisions by federal courts of appeals at some point are rejected by the
Supreme Court, the copyrightability of XML schemas under recent decisions
may turn on how similar XML schemas are to works such as model laws and
One might object that the approach suggested here means that any software designed to achieve
interoperability will be unprotectable. This is not, however, the effect. At most, the approach would
mean that the particular portion of a program that allows for interoperability is unprotectable if the
interoperability cannot be achieved with other code. For example, in a text editor, if a portion of the code
must reproduce certain terms to create a file in a standard format, the portion that consists of the
reproduction of those terms will not be copyrightable. But the remaining code, which can be varied
without defeating the ability to produce a file in the standard format, remains copyrightable. XML
schemas are different because they consist almost entirely of the terms that must be reproduced to create
a file in the standard format.
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taxonomies of medical procedures, which have been held not to merge with
ideas.
1. Model Laws. In Veeck v. Southern Building Code Congress International,
Inc.,181 the Fifth Circuit recently considered whether model building codes,
once enacted into law, become a "fact" or "idea" that can be expressed in
only one way and thus become uncopyrightable.'18 The accused infringer
asserted that "there can be only one expression of the law."' The court
examined the model building codes "at the times of their creation," however,
and asked "whether at that instant they merged with the idea of 'building
codes'... .,184 The court concluded that they did not, because "there remain
many ways to write model building codes, not just one."',8
The court's opinion leaves unclear precisely what the unprotected idea
was alleged to be ("the law," of which assertedly "there can be only one
expression," or "model building codes," of which there clearly can be many).
Nevertheless, the decision clearly relies on the temporal point, namely that
a model code becomes an expression of "the law" only after it is enacted." 6
Likewise, an XML schema may become an industry standard if it gains
acceptance, but may not be when created. Is the schema, when created,
therefore an expression that has not yet merged with an idea?
There is a key difference between model building codes and XML
schemas. A model building code, before enactment, is what one might call
"law manqu6 ." It is not capable of "functioning" as law. It may be
influential, but does not have the force of law. If people modify their
behavior because of it, they presumably do so in anticipation of its becoming
.. 241 F.3d 398, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1665 (5th Cir. 2001).
182 Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135, 138 n.5 (5th Cir. 1992). There are differences
among the circuits on whether "merger" is a doctrine defining limits on copyrightability or limits on
actionable infringement. Compare Veeck, 241 F.3d at 407 ("In this circuit, the merger doctrine has been
applied to the question whether a work was copyrightable at the time of its creation, preventing a
copyright from attaching in the first place, rather than as an infringement defense focusing on merger at
the time of copying."), with Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g Co., 158 F.3d 674, 688 n.12 (2d Cir.
1998) (noting that the Second Circuit treats the merger doctrine as relating to whether there has been
actionable infringement), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 3732 (1999).
18. Veeck, 241 F.3d at 407.
184 Id
..s Id. See also CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. MacLean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 74, 33
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1183 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that a state's reference to copyrighted work in legal
standard does not deprive work of copyright protection); but cf Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253
(1888) (stating that judicial opinions are not copyrightable).
... It may later become "the law," but Veeck indicates that a work, once protected, cannot later be
"denuded" of copyright protection under the merger doctrine. 241 F.3d at 407.
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law, but such action is only a matter of anticipation. Because the model code
is not law when it is fixed, copyright protection attaches and (according to
the decision) cannot later disappear.
In contrast, a well-formed XML schema, from the instant it is created, can
"function" as part of a markup language."8 7 If the markup language is an
unprotectable "system," merger has occurred at the time the expression of
the schema is fixed. The schema can be used as part of or together with an
XML document and an XML parser, and the schema immediately will work,
if it is well-formed. There is no need for any contingent event, such as
legislative enactment. Industry standardization may determine how widely
the schema is used, but is unnecessary to merge schema with system.
2. Industry Classifications. In Practice Management Information Corp. v.
American Medical Association,188 the accused infringer maintained that a set
of medical procedure codes that had been mandated by the federal govern-
ment for use in Medicaid applications became "an uncopyrightable industry
standard or 'idea.' "189 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, stating: "[The AMA's
copyright in the procedure codes] does not prevent Practice Management or
the AMA's competitors from developing comparative or better coding
systems and lobbying the federal government and private actors to adopt
them. It simply prevents wholesale copying of an existing system."'9
Although the Ninth Circuit rejected AMA's infringement claim based on
copyright misuse, the court's language on the merger doctrine appears
inconsistent with Baker and with Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act. The
Court in Baker would have reached the opposite result had it observed, a 1a
the Ninth Circuit in Practice Management, that Selden's copyright did not
prevent Baker, or Selden's competitors, from (in the Ninth Circuit's words)
"developing .. .better . . . systems." Instead, the Court made clear that
Baker and others were entitled to use Selden's specific system, so long as
Selden lacked a patent. Likewise, Section 102(b) specifically bars copyright
..7 If the schema does not correspond to the applicable requirements of XML, it may not function
until it is corrected. It seems counterintuitive, however, that defects in a functional work would increase
its copyrightability. The doctrinal answer is that the "idea," or here the "system," is an abstraction from
what the work purports to be, not a critical commentary on how well the work fulfills its purpose.
... 121 F.3d 516, 43 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) 1611 (9th Cir. 1997), 522 U.S. 923 (1997), modified on other
grounds, 133 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 1998).
I" Id at 520 n.8.
190 Id
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protection for "systems," making it unclear why the Ninth Circuit defended
copyright to prevent copying of a "system."
191
Despite these infirmities in the Ninth Circuit's analysis of the merger
doctrine in Practice Management, the Seventh Circuit adopted a similar
approach in American Dental Association v. Delta Dental Plans Ass'n. 9'
There, the Seventh Circuit considered whether a "taxonomy" of dental
procedures was copyrightable.' 93 Addressing an argument that the expression
in the taxonomy merged with facts or ideas, the court asserted that "Einstein
could have explained relativity in any of a hundred different ways; another
physicist could expound the same principles differently." 9' The court
continued:
So too with a taxonomy-of butterflies, legal citations, or
dental procedures. Facts do not supply their own principles
of organization. Classification is a creative endeavor.
Butterflies may be grouped by their color, or the shape of
their wings, or their feeding or breeding habits, or their
habitats, or the attributes of their caterpillars, or the se-
quence of their DNA; each scheme of classification could be
expressed in multiple ways. Dental procedures could be
classified by complexity, or by the tools necessary to
perform them, or by the parts of the mouth involved, or by
the anesthesia employed, or in any of a dozen different
ways. The Code's descriptions don't 'merge with the facts'
"' Id. The Ninth Circuit's unselfconscious use of the word "system" in the quoted passage to describe
the subject matter of the bar on -wholesale copying," and its treatment of the merger issue in a footnote,
suggests that Section 102(b) may not have been the court's primary concern, perhaps because the court
ruled against the AMA on the basis of copyright misuse. See id. at 520. The court distinguished Sega
Enters. v. Accolade, stating that, in Sega, the court had "not allowed the owners of copyrights in
expressions mandated by industry standards to use their copyrights to stifle independent creative
expression in the industry." ki at 520 n.8 (citing Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523-24). Sega, however, was a fair use
case, not a case that dealt with copyrightability. See 977 F.2d at 1514. Although there undoubtedly will
be important fair use issues in relation to XML schemas, such issues only arise if XML schemas are
copyrightable in the first place. This Article focuses on the copyrightability question, leaving fair use to
another day.
12 126 F.3d 977, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1296 (7th Cir. 1997).
19 Id at 977.
'9 Id at 979.
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any more than a scientific description of butterfly attributes
is part of a butterfly. 9 '
Although Einstein could have used various different words to describe
relativity, the Seventh Circuit in Delta Dental acknowledged that "many of
the core equations, such as the famous E = mc2, express 'facts' and therefore
are not copyrightable."'96 This distinction is both intriguing on its own
terms and potentially important for determining whether the merger
doctrine applies to XML schemas.
On its own terms, the distinction suggests that an equation expressing a
fact is not copyrightable, but a verbal explanation of the same fact is
copyrightable, presumably because of the greater pliability of ordinary non-
mathematical language. There may, however, be more than one way to
express an equation or more than one equation that describes a "fact."
Moreover, Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act explicitly states that an idea
is unprotectable "regardless of the form in which it is described." Delta
Dental seems to say that the form-i.e., mathematical rather than ver-
bal-makes the difference.
Accepting Delta Dental's holding at face value, does it support the view
that an XML schema is copyrightable? In Delta Dental, the taxonomy in
question was a description of dental procedures. Notwithstanding the
court's colorful expression, the basic idea seems to be, essentially, that there
are plenty of (accurate) ways to describe a given dental procedure, in contrast
to phenomena for which only one equation will do. This idea seems
consistent with the approach outlined above, in the sense that there are
multiple ways to write source code for a particular ASCII text-editing
system, but multiple vocabularies would produce different XML schemas.
Nevertheless, Delta Dental may appear difficult to square with the
proposition, advanced in this Article, that merger occurs whenever
substantial changes in a "functional" expression (like an XML schema) would
substantially compromise the functionality of the system it expresses (thus
changing the idea). The dental taxonomy, in addition to describing
procedures, provided a coding system. As the court said: "No one would
read the ADA's Code for pleasure; it was designed and is used for business
(for records of patients' dental history or making insurance claims) rather
195 Id
'9 See id at 979.
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than aesthetic purposes." 9" If one were to change the code numbers, or to
draw the lines between procedures differently, one would have a similar
system, but, arguably, it would not be the same system.
On the other hand, although the medical and dental classifications in
Practice Management and Delta Dental presumably could be and very likely
are used in connection with computer applications, the courts in those cases
did not analyze either set of classifications as "systems" in the form of
computer languages or language extensions. Nor did the courts devote any
significant explicit attention to whether the particular expression chosen was
essential to the functioning of such systems, other than to point out that
competitors remained free to develop alternative classification schemes.
VI. CONCLUSION
The copyrightability of XML-based markup languages is a special case of
the larger issue of computer language copyrightability. In turn, language
copyrightability requires us to descend into the idea-expression conundrum
and helps test whether the very construct of an idea-expression dichotomy,
as essential as it is to copyright doctrine, can be applied in a manner that
anyone might find right. This test occurs in a context charged with practical
economic importance. Despite the economic consequences, however, the
merger doctrine is so ingrained in copyright law that it has remained largely
unaffected by the trend of the last century toward increasingly detailed
copyright legislation. Courts must work out the detailed effect of the broad
principles it reflects.
Computer languages are X% actual expression (the specification or
schema) and Y% potential expression (the sentences that can be written in
the language), where Y is orders of magnitude greater than X. One who
advocates copyright protection for XML schemas in particular or computer
languages in general must offer a conception of copyright in which
protection effectively reaches beyond the narrow X to embrace the vast Y.
In doing so, the advocate for such protection must also reconcile this result
with copyright values. "It is," after all, "precisely [the] growth in creative
expression, based on the dissemination of other creative works and the
unprotected ideas contained in those works, that the Copyright Act was
" Id at 978.
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intended to promote."' Such dissemination not only provides an avenue
for an author's expression but also gives rise to the freedom and practical
ability necessary for the public to receive the author's ideas.
In the case of XML schemas, the copyright advocate can point out that
the schema itself is an original work of authorship, of which a schema user
must make an exact or substantially similar copy to make use of the schema.
Thus, before the schema user can use X to create Y, the user must be free of
copyright impediments to reproducing the essential X. If this result is
unsatisfactory, the copyright advocate may say, then the user can always
create another schema, Z.
Under the merger doctrine, however, the opponent of copyright
protection for schemas can reply that, because systems and other ideas are
uncopyrightable, there should be no need to create Z, which in any event is
not the functional equivalent of having access to X. Instead, according to the
opponent of schema copyright, the schema user is free to use X based simply
on showing that X stands equally for both a particular expression and a
particular idea-in this case, an idea that consists of a system, the functional-
ity of which depends on keeping its expression exactly the way it is. On this
view, intellectual property protection for XML schemas, if any, is available
through patent law, subject to its rigorous requirements, and does not
automatically arise as a matter of copyright.
This Article suggests that, although the question undoubtedly warrants
broad and continuing consideration, XML schemas exemplify the manner
in which computer languages force the issue of idea-expression merger. In
relevant respects, such languages are more like the equations of physics, at
least as such equations were viewed by the Seventh Circuit in Delta Dental,
than they are like verbal explanations of physical phenomena or verbal
classifications of medical and dental procedures. The key difference lies not
that in their more "technical" nature, but in the functionality of a particular
computer language as a "system" and the dependence on that functionality
of the particular expression of the language's vocabulary and syntax.
This functionality and its dependence on a particular expression uniquely
defines a language, from the moment its vocabulary and syntax are fixed, in
a way that most verbal descriptions or narratives do not. If this analysis is
correct, XML schemas are a classic example of merger, with the result that
'" Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523.
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both the X and Y of the expanding universe of potential XML expressions
are free of copyright constraints on using the schemas that are needed to
make such expressions meaningful. If XML is blank Esperanto, XML
schemas, which fill in the blanks, are the key to this meaning. The blanks
in copyright doctrine, on the other hand, are harder to fill in, and as Learned
Hand also foresaw, the debate inevitably will go on.
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